主讲人：曾辰航 副教授 中南财经大学文澜学院
时间：2019-11-22 13:30-15:00
地点：846会议室
摘要：
This paper studies the endogenous formation of cross holding and its welfare implications in asymmetric Cournot oligopoly with one acquiring firm holding passive ownership in one of its rivals. With the presence of cost asymmetry, we show that the acquiring firm will always choose to hold ownership in the most efficient rival. The optimal level of ownership is determined by the market demand, and the number and cost distribution of firms. We further analyze the welfare implications of cross holding, and characterize both socially excessive and insufficient cross holdings.
主讲人简介：
美国密苏里大学博士，中南财经政法大学文澜学院副教授，研究方向为产业组织理论，微观理论，定价理论。在Review of Industrial Organization, North American Journal of Economics and Finance, International Review of Economics and Finance, Journal of Economics, Economics Letters等SSCI期刊发表学术论文十余篇。
