主讲人：李广子 国家金融与发展实验室
时间：2019-10-17 14：00
地点：综合楼846
摘要：
Based on a manually-collected bank loan contract dataset of privately listed Chinese firms
from 2008 to 2016, we examine the effect of China’s anti-corruption intensity on loan contracting. The findings suggest that, conditional on the political connection (total factor production) of a firm, the anti-corruption intensity in the province in which a firm is located contributes to less (more) favorable loan contracting terms. Additional analysis shows that the effect of anti-corruption intensity on loan contracting is stronger for firms with higher financing constraints and weaker external legal environments. We further find that higher anti-corruption intensity is related to lower credit growth at the macro-level. We highlight the positive role of the anti-corruption intensity in improving resource allocation efficiency at the cost of credit expansion at the macro-level.
主讲人简介：
经济学博士，中国社会科学院金融研究所副研究员，银行研究室主任，国家金融与发展实验室银行研究中心副主任。美国斯坦福大学访问学者（2016年11月-2017年10月）。研究兴趣为商业银行与公司金融。在《管理世界》、《世界经济》、《金融研究》等杂志发表论文10余篇。出版专著1部，主持国家自然科学基金青年基金、国家社会科学基金一般项目等国家级项目。研究成果曾荣获2010年第七届中国金融学年会优秀论文三等奖和中国社会科学院金融研究所优秀成果二等奖2次。
